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Dilution of the Black Vote: Revisiting the
Oppressive Methods of Voting Rights
Restoration for Ex-Felons

Tara A. Jackson
“[A] nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth
and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid
of its people.”
– John F. Kennedy1
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INTRODUCTION

In the midst of election season, as we are bombarded with constant
updates on political propaganda, and cynical and analytical commentary
on those vying for the title of 45th President of the United States of
America, many are blissfully ignorant of the fact that a large number of
African Americans have been muted in the democratic process.
The right to vote, “[t]hough not regarded strictly as a natural right,
but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under
certain conditions, nevertheless . . . is regarded as a fundamental political
right, because [it preserves] all rights.”2 This ability to cast a ballot and
have a say in the political process is one that African Americans have
fought, bled and died for.3 However, many ex-felons have essentially lost
the right to vote because felon disenfranchisement laws have stripped
them of this right.
Since the early 1970s, the nation’s prison population has quadrupled
to 2.2 million, making it the world’s biggest.4 That is five to ten times the
incarceration rate in other democracies.5 This in itself, though alarming,
is not a hard pill for many to swallow. However, coupled with the fact
there are many institutional structures in American Society that ensure a
steady flow of African Americans into the prison system, there is cause
for concern.
African Americans make up a large percent of the prison population,
and not only are they faced with racial disparities in the federal
sentencing guidelines,6 but upon release they stand on shaky ground
when it comes to exercising their political power by voting. Sentencing,
though not racially neutral, is an adequate means of punishing felons for
the crimes they have committed. This paper aims to highlight the impact
of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws on the political power of African
Americans, debunk the myths justifying such laws, and propose a

2

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
See Keesha M. Middlemass, The Need To Resurrect Section 5 Of The Voting Rights
Act Of 1965, 28 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 61, 102 (2015). “Black voters had to fight to
the death for their voting rights under an umbrella that they were illegitimate voters based
on their skin color.” Id.
4
See THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds, 2014).
5
Id. at 2.
6
See Tushar Kansal, Racial Disparity in Sentencing: A Review of the Literature
(2005), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/disparity.pdf.
3
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solution that will not “over punish” ex-felons or subject them to arbitrary
classification as second class citizens.
Part II of this paper will briefly discuss the history of black voting
rights and methods of black voter suppression as well as the nexus
between the school to prison pipeline, the number of blacks that are
currently incarcerated, and the difficulty faced by ex-felons to reinstate
their voting rights. Part III will discuss felon disenfranchisement in
Florida, Iowa and Kentucky as well as the severely restrictive measures
adopted by each state for voter reinstatement and how this
disproportionately impacts African American political power.
There is a great deal of scholarship supporting the reinstatement of
ex-felon voting rights as a means of rehabilitation and as such, Part IV
will propose a national uniform system that automatically reinstates
voting rights for ex-felons after completion of their sentences, discuss a
sliding scale approach that makes federal intervention constitutional and
Eight and Fourteenth Amendment justifications for federal government
intervention. Part IV will also present arguments for reconsidering the
current precedence that would present roadblocks for invalidating felon
disenfranchisement laws. Part V will conclude by showing how ex-felon
disenfranchisement laws represent a badge of slavery, reiterate the
importance of voting rights as a function of citizenry, and the need to
eliminate hurdles that prohibit the exercising of political will of the black
community.

II.
A.

WE CAME, WE MARCHED, BUT HAVE WE CONQUERED?
Return for Repackaging: Tools for Voter Suppression.

To fully understand the implications of ex-felon disenfranchisement
on black voting power, we must take a few steps back in time. From its
inception, the franchise of voting in America was limited to white male
property owners.7 It was in 1869 that the African American man got his
right to vote through the passage of the Fifteen Amendment, which
guaranteed the right to vote to all male citizens regardless of “race, color
or previous condition of servitude.”8 Less than thirty years later, creative
devices such as grandfather clauses, literacy tests and poll taxes began to
surface. These ‘laws’ were specifically designed and used to suppress the
black vote.

7

DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (5th ed.
2012).
8
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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The Supreme Court made attempts to guard the black vote on
occasion. In Guinn v. United States for instance, grandfather clauses in
the constitutions of Maryland and Oklahoma were deemed
unconstitutional because they were repugnant to the Fifteenth
Amendment.9 However, each time the Supreme Court invalidated those
discriminatory laws, states continued to develop new, seemingly raceneutral methods of black voter suppression to ensure that black political
power remained diluted. The Supreme Court’s zealousness faded in 1937
when the Court deemed Georgia’s poll taxes constitutional in Breedlove
v. Suttles10, which remained good law until Harper v. Virginia State Bd.
Of Elections11 in 1966, after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the
Voting Rights Act.

B.

Selma: Voting Rights for All.

The infamous march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama in 1965
is seen as one of the most critical campaigns in the quest for meaningful
voting rights for blacks. Participants in the peaceful march for voting
rights were met with tear gas, whips and nightsticks when they refused to
turn back. These efforts of black activism, and the outrage at how
protesters were being treated, led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, which prohibited any election practice that denied the right to
vote to citizens on the basis of race. 12 It essentially forced jurisdictions
with histories of voter discrimination to submit any changes to its
election laws to the government for federal approval prior to taking
effect.13 Unfortunately, this was not the end of black voter suppression.
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act were constantly extended and
amended to deal with new injustices as they arose. Notably, in Mobile v.
Bolden,14 the Supreme Court read the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, and the Voting Rights Act very narrowly, requiring
discriminatory intent to be established before a voting practice could be
deemed a violation. In response to this narrow reading, in 1982, the
amendments to the Voting Rights Act overturned this ruling, noting that
it was not necessary to establish discriminatory intent.
History shows that the black vote has continuously been suppressed
through creative mechanisms designed to circumvent anti-discrimination
laws, and accordingly, any mechanism that disproportionately affects
9

See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
11
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
12
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
13
Id.
14
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
10
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black voting power must be met with the utmost suspicion. With each
amendment to the Voting Rights Act ending prior injustices, it is not
expected that more modern forms of black voter suppression will
manifest themselves as blatantly as they would have prior to the march in
Selma. However, the systematic forces that result in mass black voter
suppression remain alive and well.

C.
Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Same Product, Different
Packaging.
In 1974, the Supreme Court presented states with a new opportunity
to suppress the black vote when the Court in Richardson v. Ramirez held
that it was constitutional for states to deny convicted felons the right to
vote.15 At first glance this ruling may seem racially neutral, but there are
many institutional structures in place that ensure a steady inflow of
blacks to prison, and therefore, ex-felon disenfranchisement laws must
be examined closely.
The School to Prison Pipeline16 is one such structure, which is
known to disproportionately impact students of color. By prioritizing
incarceration over education, many schools serving predominantly black
communities have zero-tolerance policies that do not allow students the
‘luxury’ of a trip to the principal’s office as a response to undesirable
behavior. For black students, violating school rules can easily land them
in prison. The “historical inequalities in the education system—
segregated education, concentrated poverty, and longstanding
stereotypes—influence how school officials and law enforcement both
label children and treat students who present challenging behavior.”17 A
2014 report from Department of Education Office for Civil Rights
showed that school administrators expelled, and law enforcement
arrested, African American students in startlingly disproportionate
numbers compared to white students.18 These students who are
unnecessarily forced out of school become stigmatized and as a result,
15

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
“The ‘school-to-prison pipeline’ refers to the policies and practices that push our
nation’s schoolchildren, especially our most at-risk children, out of classrooms and into
the juvenile and criminal justice systems.” What Is The School-To-Prison Pipeline?, AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/what-school-prison-pipeline
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
17
School to Prison Pipeline, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND,
http://www.naacpldf.org/case/school-prison-pipeline (last visited Dec. 12, 2015).
18
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION:
DATA
SNAPSHOT:
SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE
1
(2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf (noting that
Black students are suspended and expelled at a rate three times greater than white
students).
16
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frequently fall behind in their academics, drop out of school and/or resort
to committing crimes in their communities. 19
On that note, it is no surprise that black men are incarcerated at a
much higher rate than any other race in America. Although mass
incarceration can be attributed to public policy, it is institutionalized
racism that ensured the sustenance of these policies over time. As of
2012, one in seven African Americans were disenfranchised by felony
convictions and in five states more than twenty percent of blacks could
not vote because of their criminal records.20 In a stark comparison with
times long gone, it was noted that in 2012, more African American men
were “in the grip of the criminal-justice system - in prison, on probation,
or on parole - than were in slavery.”21 More recently, in 2014, it was
again noted that black males had higher imprisonment rates than
prisoners of other races or Hispanic origin within every age group.
Imprisonment rates for black males were 3.8 to 10.5 times greater at each
age group than white males and 1.4 to 3.1 times greater than rates for
Hispanic males.”22 With these details in mind, the race neutral façade of
the ex-felon disenfranchisement laws is exposed. The issue of mass
incarceration began to raise cause for concern in the 1970s, around the
same time period of Richardson v. Ramirez, but is far worse now than
ever.23 The fact that there is overrepresentation of blacks in the prison
population is no accident, and “felon disenfranchisement laws, which
trace back to the post-Reconstruction era when former Confederates and
white Southern Democrats rolled back the political gains made by free
slaves after the war“24, have been conveniently manipulated to constantly
dilute the black vote.
If one needs further evidence of the disproportionate impact that exfelon disenfranchisement laws have on the black vote, a quick
19
Carla Amurao, Fact Sheet: How Bad Is the School-to-Prison Pipeline?, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/tavissmiley/tsr/education-under-arrest/school-to-prisonpipeline-fact-sheet/ (last updated Mar. 28, 2013).
20
George Lipsitz, In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty: The Collateral
Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing Rights,
59 UCLA L. REV. 1746, 1783 (2012).
21
Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/thecaging-of-america?currentPage=all.
22
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014 15 (2015),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf.
23
See Editorial, End Mass Incarceration Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/opinion/sunday/end-mass-incarcerationnow.html?_r=0.
24
See Jamelle Bouie, The Ex-Con Factor, THE AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 20, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/ex-con-factor.
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comparison to prior suppression mechanisms is useful. Literacy tests,
like the current felon disenfranchisement laws, were initially regarded
race neutral. However, the method of application and disproportionate
impact on black voting power lead to the abolition of literacy tests. In
one article, it was noted that felon disenfranchisement laws mirror the
discriminatory nature of literacy tests in two significant ways: (1) they
each depend on racial discrimination in other relevant areas of American
society to produce a racially disparate impact, and (2) the racial bias
associated with the discretionary implementation of each regulation
serves to exclude minorities, particularly African Americans, from the
political process.25 In recognition of the fact that some whites would
inevitably fail the literacy tests, grandfather clauses were created,
essentially permitting anyone who could vote on January 1, 1867, and his
sons and grandsons, to continue to vote without passing the required
literacy test. One may confidently infer that the invention of the
grandfather clause shows that literacy tests were meant to be a catchall
for blacks because it essentially allowed those whites that could
potentially be deemed ‘illiterate’ to still participate in the democratic
process because of their lineage. Clearly, blacks were unable to take
advantage of the grandfather clauses because they were unable to vote
until 1869, two years after the grandfather clause cut off.
Also, the felon disenfranchisement laws also bare stark similarity to
the poll taxes, which were utilized to filter out black voters from the
political process. Although also viewed as a race neutral measure,
operationally it excluded a large number of black voters because many
were unable to pay the tax levied due to financial constraints. Essentially,
most blacks were excluded from the democratic process based on their
economic circumstances. Felon disenfranchisement is similar in that it
also excludes a large number of blacks from the democratic process
because of their incarceration, the result of the institutional racist
mechanisms such as over prosecution and disproportionately harsher
sentencing for crimes compared to their white counterparts. However,
the passage of the Twenty-fourth Amendment prevented states from
continuing to use poll taxes to exclude blacks from the ballot.26
One common misconception is that the Voting Rights Act of 1965
coupled with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments completely
dismantled all the voting restrictions of the Jim Crow era, but felony
disenfranchisement is arguably the last remaining strand of the web of
laws carefully crafted to keep blacks from the ballot that remains
25

Daniel S. Goldman, Note, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?:
Disenfranchisement and Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. REV. 611, 614 (2004).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (addressing right to vote without poll tax).

Felon
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unscathed by the Voting Rights Act.27 Recently, in Shelby County v.
Holder, the Supreme Court essentially struck down key provisions in the
Voting Rights Act and urged Congress to pass legislation that reflects the
current conditions in America.28 One article perfectly encapsulated the
gravity of this holding, noting
“The voting rights that were fought for in the events of “Selma” are
today under attack from state governments across the country . . .
whether through simple gerrymandering, the intimidations of stringent
voter-I.D. requirements . . . or the simple calculated scarcity of polling
places . . . and even from the grossly disproportionate rate of
incarceration,
where
felony
convictions
often
result
in
29
disenfranchisement.”
This holding gives us a glimpse of the Supreme Court’s indifference
towards the impact that certain voting rights laws have on the black
community. A look back at the history books will reveal the true
motives of passing felony disenfranchisement laws. In Florida, while
granting suffrage to black citizens in 1868 with its rewritten constitution,
the state simultaneously disenfranchised many of its new citizens by
restricting all felons from voting for life.30 In Mississippi,
disenfranchisement laws were modified to apply only to those convicted
of certain petty crimes considered to be far more prevalent among black
offenders than white.31 Today’s version of felony disenfranchisement,
although not as narrowly tailored, “still disproportionately affects black
citizens, diluting the power of the collective black vote in elections, and
thus [still] explicitly fulfill[s] the legacy of the Jim Crow era.”32
Over-policing of black neighborhoods, mass incarceration of blacks
and the school to prison pipeline that remains entrenched in black
communities represent some of the current ‘conditions’ that need to be
remedied, but the majority in Shelby County v. Holder casually dismissed
the effects of these realities when deeming the Voting Rights Act as
‘outdated.’ However, with the state of the Supreme Court in flux due to

27

See Elizabeth Simson, Justice Denied: How Felony Disenfranchisement Laws
Undermine American Democracy, AM. FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION FUND 16 (2002),
http://www.adaction.org/media/lizfullpaper.pdf.
28
See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (noting “Our country has
changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure
that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”).
29
Richard Brody, The Crucial Lessons of Democracy in “Selma”, THE NEW YORKER
(Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-brody/crucial-lessonsdemocracy-selma.
30
See Simson, supra note 27.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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the sudden passing of the esteemed Justice Scalia,33 the attitude of the
Court may very well shift with the appointment of a less conservative
successor. The decision in Shelby County v. Holder, was 5-4 and the
dissenting justices had no reservations when stating their vehement
opposition, noting that while the majority acknowledged that voting
discrimination still existed, it “terminates the remedy that proved to be
best suited to block that discrimination.”34 Also, in response to the
majority’s call for more modern legislation, the dissent highlighted that
Congress, recognizing the progress that the Voting Rights Act has
facilitated but noting that discrimination still pervaded the democratic
process, decided that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act should continue
in force.35 It appears that the dissent had a view that was more focused on
the current state of American society than the majority, so it is not
farfetched to assume that the new makeup of the Court is likely to
become more receptive to the arguments being proposed in this note.

III.

THE ROCKY ROAD TO REINSTATEMENT

Mercedies Harris was a young ex-Marine who was arrested in 1990
for drug possession in Virginia at the age of twenty-seven.36 In prison, he
earned his GED and upon release in 2003, he found a job and started to
rebuild his life.37 He recounted that one especially difficult obstacle for
him was that he could no longer vote.38 He noted, “It was important to
[him] to have a place in this democracy, and to have a say, too.”39 With
that he began the voting rights restoration process, which for him, lasted
for four years.40 Thankfully, he was persistent enough to see it through.
In 2014, then Attorney General Eric Holder pleaded with states to
remove the restrictions on voting rights for ex-felons.41 The approach to
ex-felon disenfranchisement varies tremendously from state to state. In
some states, most ex-felons gain an automatic right to vote after
completing their sentence. In others states, ex-felons have a waiting
33

See, e.g., Brett Kendall, Scalia’s Absence Shifts Dynamic of Supreme Court, WALL.
ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2016, 12:27 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/scalias-absence-shiftsdynamics-of-supreme-court-1455419151.
34
See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2633 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
35
Id. at 2632-33.
36
Bouie, supra note 24.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See Eric Holder, Remarks on Criminal Justice Reform, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb.
11, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-deliversremarkson-criminal-justice-reform-georgetown.
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period before their voting rights can be restored. The most extreme states
require ex-felons to go through an application process to have their rights
restored. Even in the most lenient states, where voting rights are
automatically restored, inconsistent communication, lack of information,
massive backlogs and complicated paperwork can make the restoration
process an overwhelming one.

A.

Florida

On numerous occasions, Florida has been called the harshest state in
relation to ex-felon disenfranchisement laws. It is important to highlight
that statistics reported in 2010 noted that African Americans comprise
half of the state’s prison population, but represent only fifteen percent of
the state’s overall population.42 Under the Florida Constitution, a
convicted felon cannot vote, serve on a jury, or hold public office until
civil rights have been restored.43 Additionally, the state requires exfelons to wait five years after completing their sentences before applying
for restoration of rights without a hearing, and seven years for
applications requiring a hearing. Assuming an ex-felon waits the
requisite time, navigates through the complicated application process,
and finally makes it to a hearing, he bears the burden of proving that he
has become a “good citizen“. If he does the right things, says the right
things and becomes a pillar in his community, he still runs the risk of
having his restoration application arbitrarily denied, without any reason.
To understand how real the impact of these laws are on the
democratic process and more specifically, black voting power, we can
look back at the November 2000 presidential election. Florida’s felony
disenfranchisement laws at that time excluded 600,000 ex-felons from
participating in the electoral process. Many of these “ex-felons” were in
fact mistakenly identified as such and banned from voting.44 This was
due to a profoundly flawed purge process plagued by false positives.45 A
study that estimated voter turnout and party preferences for felons and
ex-felons showed that, from 1972 to 2000, around thirty-five percent of
42

Inmate
Population,
FLA.
DEP’T
OF
CORR,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/0910/stats/im_pop.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
43
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
44
See Marc Mauer, Disenfranchising Felons Hurts Entire Communities, JOINT CTR.
FOR
POLITICAL
AND
ECON.
STUDIES
6
(May/June
2004),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_focus.pdf.
45
See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the
Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1158-59 (2004) (“For
example, persons were removed because their names resembled those of convicted
felons, or despite the fact that their convictions did not trigger disenfranchisement under
Florida law, or even though their voting rights had been restored.”).
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disenfranchised felons would have voted, and on average seventy-seven
percent of felon voters would have voted Democratic.46 Professor
Uggen’s data also asserted that, “approximately 10.5% of voting age
African Americans . . . in Florida are disenfranchised as ex-felons, as
compared to 4.4% of the non-African American population.”47 These
statistics clearly demonstrate that disenfranchisement laws are most
lethal to the African America community.

B.

Iowa

According to the Iowa Constitution, “no idiot, or insane person, or
person convicted of any infamous crime, shall be entitled to the privilege
of an elector.48 The State defines an infamous crime as “a crime that may
be punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary for a period of one year
or more” and is not limited to felonies but “may include aggravated
misdemeanors.”49 In order for an individual to have his voting rights
restored, he must submit a streamlined application, a signed release,
documentation verifying payments of court costs, fines and restitution
and his Iowa criminal history record.50 Although Governor Terry
Branstad simplified the application’s instructions, removed the credit
check, and eliminated the requirement to fully pay off all restitution,
fines, and court costs before applying for voting rights restoration, the
process remains laborious.
The ACLU challenged Iowa’s felon-voting laws, noting, “[t]he
widespread denial of voting rights on the basis of a felony conviction is
the single biggest denial of civil rights in Iowa. It has kept thousands of
Iowans from voting.”51 Additionally, before these restrictive laws were
adopted, an earlier policy allowed Iowa offenders automatically regain
their voting rights when they left state supervision.52 Unsurprisingly, this
46
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction?: Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777,
792-93 (2002).
47
Karlan, supra note 45, at 1157.
48
IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5.
49
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS FAQS, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF IOWA (Feb. 22, 2013),
https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Citizenship-Rights-FAQ.pdf.
50
Id.
51
Ryan J. Foley, ACLS files lawsuit challenging Iowa felon-voting laws, THE DES
MOINES REGISTER (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crimeand-courts/2014/11/07/aclu-lawsuit-iowa-exfelon-voting-law/18654785/.
52
When Governor Terry Branstad took office in Iowa in January 2011, he rescinded
Executive Order 42 that had restored voting rights to Iowa citizens who had completed
their sentences. See Rod Boshart, Branstad Rescinds Labor, Voting Orders, SIOUX CITY J.
(Jan. 15, 2011), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/branstadrescinds-labor-voting-orders/article_af6e450c-b77f-5026-935b-b055d42cc167.html.
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drastic policy change created confusion, which ultimately led to many
perjury charges for ex-felon who casted ballots believing they were able
to vote.53 Iowa, like Florida, is considered one of the harsher states with
regards to felon disenfranchisement, and ex-felons in both states have
had considerable confusion when attempting to navigate the road to
reinstatement. It is safe to say that the various state structures in place for
reinstatement of voting rights for ex-felons are so convoluted that many
simply opt out of the reinstatement process altogether. Those who
decide to walk the rocky road to reinstatement do so with the hope that
they will be given fair treatment, but of course, if such is not the case,
their only recourse is to try and try again, as most states do not have
safeguards to prevent arbitrary denial of petitions to restore voting rights.

C.

Kentucky

Kentucky is another state that permanently disenfranchises ex-felons
from voting. It is estimated that 243,842 Kentuckians with felony
convictions were barred from voting in 2010 and of those, 180,984 had
already completed their sentences.54 Under the state constitution, former
felons have to petition the governor in order to have their voting rights
restored. The process for doing so is a very tricky and lengthy one, and
doesn’t guarantee a result, partly because each governor sets up his own
procedure during his or her tenure. In 2014, as a substitute for automatic
restoration, a Kentucky constitutional amendment that would restore
most felons’ voting rights after a five-year waiting period passed in the
senate.55
However, the status of felon disenfranchisement in the state appears
to have been in flux since then. Interestingly, the state’s current and
previous governors appear to disagree on the issue of whether felon
disenfranchisement is beneficial for the state.
Steve Beshear, who was the Governor of Kentucky until late 2015,
set up a process for restoration of voting rights for ex-felons shortly
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See Foley, supra note 51 (One such person, stay-at-home mother Kelli Jo Griffin,
was the plaintiff in the 2014 ACLU lawsuit challenging Iowa’s felon voting laws).
54
Background information on restoration of voting rights in Kentucky, KENTUCKIANS
FOR
THE
COMMONWEALTH
(2013),
https://www.kftc.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/background_information_on_votin
g_rights_in_ky.pdf.
55
Sam Youngman, Bill restoring felons’ voting rights passes Senate with five-year
waiting
period,
LEXINGTON
HERALD
LEADER
(Feb.
19,
2014),
http://www.kentucky.com/2014/02/19/3097375/senate-panel-okays-amendmentto.html#storylink=cpy.
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before he departed office.56 This step in the right direction was quickly
undone by his successor, Matt Bevin, who believed that the issue of
restoration of voting rights would be better addressed through the
legislature.57 It is obvious that political friction has resulted in these
inconsistencies and sadly, ex-felons attempting to navigate the path to
reinstatement are left at the whim of each new governor. Like all other
states that disenfranchise felons, Kentucky’s policy disproportionately
impacts blacks. It is estimated that one in five African Americans in
Kentucky are disenfranchised, compared to one in thirteen nationally.58
Essentially black voting power is more diluted in Kentucky than it is
nationwide. Also, noteworthy is the fact that Kentucky has the second
highest African American disenfranchisement rate in the country.59
Currently, in order for an ex-felon to have his or her voting rights
restored in Kentucky, the individual must fill out a form60 requesting
voting rights restoration through the Governor’s executive pardoning
power. While this form itself is not as cumbersome to complete, the
inconsistencies regarding the process for voting rights restoration is
cause for concern.

IV.

THE CASE FOR AUTOMATIC RESTORATION OF VOTING
RIGHTS
“Without a vote, I am a ghost inhabiting a citizen’s
space . . . “

56
Kentucky Governor Creates New Process to Help Restore Voting Rights to 170,000
Citizens, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/pressrelease/kentucky-governor-creates-new-process-help-restore-voting-rights-170000citizens [hereinafter 170,000 Citizens].
57
Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Kentucky, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST..(Dec. 24,
2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-effortskentucky.
58
170,000 Citizens, supra note 56.
59
Felony Disenfranchisement in Kentucky, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF KY.,
http://innovise.me:8080/aclu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/hb_70_handout-for-newwebsite.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
60
See Civil Rights Application, KY. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS (2015),
http://corrections.ky.gov/communityinfo/Documents/Civil%20Rights/Civil%20Rights%2
0Application%20Rev%2011-25-2015.pdf (It is apparent that keeping ex-felon rights
restoration information is not high on the State’s list of priorities because at the time of
writing this article, the form that is widely available for ex-felons to complete for
restoring voting rights was still not updated with information reflecting the reversal of the
Governor B’s executive order.)
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– Joe Loya, disenfranchised ex-felon.61

A.

IS FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT WARRANTED?

Based on the statistics presented thus far, it is evident that a very
large percent of the black population is funneled through the criminal
justice system, and, as a result, temporarily or permanently lose their
political power. Some of the earliest felon disenfranchisement laws rest
on the Lockean theory that those who break the social contract should
not be allowed to participate in the society’s rule making process.62 This
social contract theory rests on the premise that all persons who break the
‘social contract’ are convicted, and, simply put, that is false. What
remains true, however, is the fact that without any voice in the political
process, these ex-felons will essentially be demoted to ‘second class
citizens’ and are more likely to reoffend.63 Further, if we are to stay true
to the social contract theory, in the purest sense, we must content with
the notion that obligations are conditioned on benefits. To follow the
social contract theory would mean that those who “break the contract”
would, in addition to losing access to certain benefits, be free of some
obligations to society. Such an inference would clearly lead to havoc so
social contract theory as a justification for felon disenfranchisement is
inherently flawed.
There is no convincing explanation as to how allowing felons to vote
disrupts imprisonment, nor is there any solid argument for how stripping
an ex-felon of his right to vote furthers the goal of criminal
rehabilitation. To the contrary, disenfranchisement shows how far away
the American justice system has drifted from its focus on rehabilitation.
Proponents of these disenfranchisement laws sometimes argue that
making ex-felons go through a process to restore these rights will
decrease recidivism. Yet, the shortfalls of the restoration process often
lead ex-felons to abandon the process altogether. “Research indicates that
re-enfranchising ex-felons cuts the rate of recidivism by at least ten
percent, which could save and reroute millions of dollars a year toward
education or other useful purposes.”64
Roger Clegg, a proponent of felon disenfranchisement, argues that
two characteristics – trustworthiness and loyalty – are required in order
61

Christine Thompson, Losing the Vote, PRISON ISSUES (1999).
See Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Wesley v.
Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
63
See Susan Greenbaum, Restore voting rights to ex-felons, ALJAZEERA AM. (Feb. 24,
2014),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/voting-rightsfelondisenfranchisementericholdercriminaljustice.html.
64
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to vote.65 However, not much creativity is needed to refute this claim.
One federal statute unmistakably runs counter to Clegg’s theory in that it
prohibits denying citizens the right to vote because they fail to
demonstrate that they “possess good moral character.”66 This federal
statute clearly recognizes Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “the crooked timber of
humanity” which suggests that no individual is either wholly moral or
immoral,67 and as such proving morality should never be required for one
to participate in the democratic process.
One other argument for the constitutionality of these
disenfranchisement laws is the “purity of the ballot box” rationale, that
is, a state’s interest “in preserving the integrity of [its] electoral process
by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social
behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society’s
aims.”68 However, this argument fails to consider the disproportionate
treatment that blacks get as opposed to their white counterparts for the
same “anti-social behavior.” Martin Luther King correctly recognized the
effects of denying blacks the right to vote noting, “the denial of the vote
not only deprives the Negro of his constitutional rights - but what is even
worse - it degrades him as a human being.”69 The purity of the ballot box
argument perpetuates the blaming and shaming of blacks, which has
historically proved to be an effective means for white supremacists to
preserve their racial privileges without referring directly to race, and to
disguise discrimination as family protection and moral uplift.70
It is my submission that continued disenfranchisement serves no
purpose other than to over-punish ex-felons. These people have already
been through the judicial process, which punished them in a manner
deemed appropriate based on the crime that was committed. They have
paid their debt to society and as such, rehabilitation and assimilation
back into the community upon release are the goals that should be
furthered instead of permanently inking them with the “stain of prior
imprisonment.” Additionally, since disenfranchisement is not conferred
by a judge as part of the sentencing process, it unfairly penalizes all
convicted felons without regard to the severity of their offenses or any
mitigating facts brought out in their trials. Simply put, felon
65

Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV OF L. & POL’Y. 159, 174 (2001).
52 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (3) (2012).
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See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY
OF IDEAS (Henry Hardy ed., 2nd ed. 2013).
68
Alice T. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence On The
Black Vote: The Need For A Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1162-63 (1994).
69
DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. ET AL., THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR:
THRESHOLD OF A NEW DECADE, JANUARY 1959-DECEMBER 1960 188 (2005).
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disenfranchisement laws have no place in modern American society and
as Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, disenfranchisement “doubtless has
been brought forward into modern statutes without fully realizing the
effect of its literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the
spirit of our system of government.”71

B.

Legal Challenges: Tried and Failed.

While there have been numerous legal challenges to felony
disenfranchisement laws in the United States, most have been
unsuccessful because courts have declined to apply the same legal
principles regarding the fundamental right to vote to ex-felons. In an
attempt to get any form of justice, some claims have even been brought
regarding the misapplication of these disenfranchisement laws,
vagueness in defining which crimes are disenfranchising, and the racial
inequities inherent in the criminal justice system that result in minorities
being disproportionately disenfranchised. It is evident, however, that any
attempt to reshape felon disenfranchisement statutes at a federal level
must surpass significant hurdles before they are even given serious
consideration.
Currently, in order to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause,
“plaintiffs must make two showings.72 They must first show that the
voting law has a disproportionate impact and then demonstrate that
discriminatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in its
enactment.”73 However, the requirement to prove discriminatory intent
unfairly places the burden on the victims to obtain information that
oppressors will not likely provide them with. To prevent victims from
successfully challenging these laws, lawmakers only need a facially
neutral reason, such as the purity of the ballot argument, to pass muster.
We live in a world where the concentrated poverty in Black and
Latino neighborhoods has essentially been criminalized. Persistent
surveillance, over-policing and prosecution of what are essentially
crimes of condition rather than crimes of conduct also function in concert
to create a new category of people of color whose rights can be restricted
or disposed of completely without having to acknowledge any racist
intent.74 Therefore, in the interest of fairness, in determining whether
such laws are contrary to the equal protection clause, it is the racially
71
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Byers v.
Sun Savings Bank, 139 P. 948 (Okla. 1914)).
72
Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD.
85, 90 (2004).
73
Id.
74
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discriminatory impact, not intent, that should be the central focus in
analysis.
The Voting Rights Act, recognized and addressed this issue in its
1982 amendment stating, “no voting qualification . . . or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen . . . to
vote on account of race or color.”75 With renewed confidence that the
legislature’s clarity could not be misinterpreted, challenges to felon
disenfranchisement laws resurfaced. In Wesley v. Collins, the court, after
noting a history of discrimination with continuing present-day effects,
held that other social and political factors, such as the state’s legitimate
purpose for enacting the statute, led to the conclusion that there was no
violation of the VRA.”76 And so, courts continued to chip away at the
VRA.77 More recently, as discussed in Part II.C the Court in Shelby
County v. Holder signaled its discontent with the VRA, and encouraged
Congress to make it “up to date.” This note proposes that states should be
mandated to automatically reinstate ex-felon voting rights after their
sentences have been served. Because of the racially disproportionate
impact that felon disenfranchisement laws have on the exercise of Black
political power, the federal government should intervene to create a
uniform system for automatic restoration of voting rights for ex-felons.
This should be a key consideration in the updating of the Voting Rights
Act.

C.

Revisiting the Idea of Federal Intervention

While there have been many unsuccessful attempts to invalidate
disenfranchisement laws on constitutional grounds, the continued
dilution of black political power will only ensure the preservation of

75

52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012).
See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986).
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See Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Congress
exempted felon disenfranchisement from reach of § 2) (“We agree with the Second
Circuit that the language of § 2(a) is both broad and ambiguous and that judicial
interpretation of a claim concerning felon disenfranchisement under the VRA may not be
limited to the text of § (2)(a) alone”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 412 (2010). See also
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2006) (listing reasons to conclude that
Congress did not intend to include felon disenfranchisement provisions within coverage
of VRA). See also Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(requiring proof of intentional discrimination) Here, noting long history of felon
disenfranchisement, legislative history, affirmative sanction of Fourteenth Amendment,
and safeguards of criminal justice system, the Ninth Circuit improperly ignored both the
plain language of the Act and established Supreme Court precedent in requiring
discriminatory intent to succeed on such a claim.
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institutional racism.78 Arguments supporting felon disenfranchisement
laws must be reconsidered in the context of the mass incarceration that
has taken place in the last few decades.

1. The Fourteenth Amendment Argument
One theory that describes the states as “laboratories of democracy,”
posits that powers reserved for each state, when exercised, can foster a
diverse set of laws and those that are most successful will spread across
the nation so citizens don’t vote with their feet and move to states with
laws that are more aligned with their interests. 79 Besides the almost
commonsensical reality that this theory has not played out as neatly as
suggested,80 there is yet another issue. Most ex-felons, who have been
stripped of their right to vote, are often also legally prohibited from
travelling between states.81 Additionally, they encounter even more
confusion about laws and processes of a new state if the decide to move
across states. For instance, no state has a systematic mechanism set up to
address ex-felon immigration, and scholars have observed that there is
“no consensus among indefinite-disenfranchisement states on whether
the disqualification is properly confined to the state of conviction, or
should be considered in the new state of residence.”82 An ex-felon who
attempts to weave through this maze of confusion must also contend with
some state laws that make fraudulent voter registration a felony.
Although the Supreme Court has not held that felon
disenfranchisement is unconstitutional, it has suggested that arguments
that felon disenfranchisement laws are outmoded are well founded but

78

See Miles, supra note 72, at 86-87 (collecting observations on the disproportionality
in disenfranchisement).
79
See Lynn Eisenberg, Note, States As Laboratories For Federal Reform: Case
Studies In Felon Disenfranchisement Law, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 575
(2012).
80
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CON
(Feb.
9,
2016),
See
State
Felon
Voting
Laws,
PRO
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are to be addressed by the legislature.83 The Fourteenth Amendment is
often resorted to as a means of challenging felon disenfranchisement
statutes because, section 284 of the Fourteenth Amendment was originally
written with the purpose of discouraging states from disenfranchising
their constituents. One author has proposed a sliding scale approach for
dealing with VRA challenges to felon disenfranchisement,85 much like
that taken in Burdick v. Takushi.86 He proposes that courts consider the
totality of the circumstances by combining factors that other courts and
scholars currently discuss when addressing felon disenfranchisement
challenges. The proposed sliding scale would require plaintiffs to prove
three elements: (1) he cannot vote due to the state’s disenfranchisement
laws, (2) develop a record of statistical data suggesting racial bias in the
state criminal justice system, and (3) show that his race faces a bias in
the justice systems.87
The sliding scale comes into play after the prima facie case is made.
“When a plaintiff establishes significant racial bias and the challenged
statute is expansive in scope, courts should apply strict scrutiny.”88
“Conversely, when a plaintiff fails to show significant bias and the law is
limited in scope, courts should apply rational basis review to the
statute.”89 “If both the level of racial bias and the scope of the law are
moderate, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny.”90This sliding scale
approach rests on solid ground and also preemptively addresses any
potential constitutionality concerns91 in that it
[E]nables courts to distinguish the legally valid laws
from the impermissible laws by focusing on the burden
83

See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55-56 (1974) (holding “that the Supreme
Court of California erred in concluding that California may no longer, consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, exclude from the franchise
convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles.”).
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imposed on minority voting rights. This distinction
enables section 2 of the VRA to parallel the Fourteenth
Amendment’s minority rights protection, while
respecting that Amendment’s limited authorization for
felon disenfranchisement. Thus, allowing courts to strike
specific felon disenfranchisement statutes under the
VRA would neither conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor unconstitutionally alter the federalstate balance.92
This approach rests on very solid footing and serious consideration
must be given to revisiting the idea of federal intervention to protect the
rights of these citizens from continuously being abridged. The sliding
scale approach treads delicately so as not to compromise state
sovereignty without there being a serious constitutional issue warranting
federal intervention.

2. The Eight Amendment Argument
One other viable option to justify federal intervention that has
generated far less attention is that felon disenfranchisement laws are
cruel and usual punishment and as such, violate the Eight Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits governmental imposition of “cruel and
unusual punishments.”93 This argument is worthy of far more scholarship
because constitutional limits on punishment are more restrictive than
limits on regulations, so if it can be proved that felon disenfranchisement
laws are punitive, they will be scrutinized under a more demanding set of
legal standards. The first hurdle one must overcome when making such a
bold assertion is proving that disenfranchisement is indeed punishment.
As mentioned before, the social contract theory upon which felon
disenfranchisement laws are based rests on the notion that bad actors that
break the social contract should be removed from the rule making
process. One author discussing felon disenfranchisement noted, “it
punishes not only individual citizens, most of whom have otherwise paid
their debt to society and reentered the free world, but the communities
which bear the brunt of the criminal laws the political system enacts.”94
However, in Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren classified these
laws as a “non penal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise.”95
92
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Interestingly, Chief Justice Warren never gave adequate support for this
conclusion and in dealing with the issue of Trop he noted, “a statute that
prescribes the consequence that will befall one who fails to abide by . . .
regulatory provisions is a penal law.”96 This seems to directly conflict
with his conclusion about disenfranchisement laws simply because the
basis of these laws serve no other purpose than to put offenders in the
‘naughty corner’ on voting day until they convince the state that they will
behave.
Additionally, the federal statute that bans the use of literacy tests
nationwide because such tests served no compelling interest and
perpetuated the exclusion of minority citizens, also barred denying the
right to vote to citizens who could not establish that they “possess good
moral
character.”97
Moreover,
Trop’s
classification
of
disenfranchisement as regulatory does not hold up against all the statutes,
later decisions and constitutional amendments that have transformed
suffrage from being considered a privilege to now becoming a right of
adult citizenship. 98 Consequently, it is my submission that the dicta in
Trop that currently bars Eighth Amendment claims stands on very shaky
ground.99
Assuming one is successful in characterizing disenfranchisement as
punishment, the second hurdle to overcome is proving that this
punishment is in fact cruel and unusual. Innate in the term cruel and
unusual is a level of fluidity. As society’s values change, so too will the
meaning of cruel and usual punishment because it must be measured
against what society deems appropriate punishment. In Weems v. United
States, the court provided that a state-imposed punishment may not be
excessive, but must be “graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”100
Given that the level or length of felon disenfranchisement is never
lessened or increased based on the severity of a crime or any mitigating
factors, some disenfranchised ex-felons who commit less serious crimes
96

Id. at 97.
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may have a viable Eighth Amendment claim. First, they may argue that
as a form of punishment, disenfranchisement violates the country’s
current standards of decency.101 Second, petitioners may argue that
disenfranchisement is a “grossly disproportionate” punishment for a
particular offense.102
To support an argument that felon disenfranchisement violates the
country’s current standards of decency, one can present statistics such as
a public opinion poll designed by sociologists from Northwestern
University, Indiana University, and the University of Minnesota which
suggests that approximately 80% of the American public supports
restoration of voting rights for most ex-felons.103 While this evidence
carries less weight than legislation and judicial precedence, it recognizes
the fluidity of the ever-changing concept of cruel and unusual
punishment.
In proving that disenfranchisement is grossly
disproportionate punishment, it is easy to see that “categorical
disenfranchisement of all ex-offenders convicted of a felony [that] lumps
together crimes of vastly different gravity”104 is inherently
disproportionate for those convicted of less serious offences.
Additionally, since, disenfranchisement runs counter to the goals of
rehabilitation and deterrence, instead of being categorized as a legitimate
means to an end, it can appropriately be deemed cruel.
3. Obstacles to Overcome
Both the Fourteenth Amendment argument and the Eighth
Amendment argument present the Supreme Court with ample support to
inquire about and assess the constitutionality of each state’s
disenfranchisement laws. In reviving these arguments, it is my hope that
these laws will continue to be challenged with both arguments so the
Court can reassess its stance on the issue. Fairness, integrity and
democracy demand it. It must be noted that the doctrine of stare
decisis105 mandates that for these and any other arguments challenging
felon disenfranchisement laws, they must contend with the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Richardson v. Ramirez and Trop v Dulles. The
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factors providing a basis for reconsidering precedence were discussed in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which noted,
“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior
decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”106
The Court explained that it would first examine whether the central
rule of the case in question has proven unworkable, or whether “the
rule’s limitation on state power could be removed without serious
inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the
stability of the society governed by [the rule in question].”107 Also, the
Court explained that it would look to see whether the doctrine in question
has been abandoned by society and, whether the factual premises
supporting the holding have fundamentally changed such that the central
holding of the precedent is unjustifiable or irrelevant.108
In considering whether to revise the holding in Richardson v.
Ramirez, it wouldn’t be difficult to argue the impracticability of felon
disenfranchisement laws. In Part III, the inherent issues with the current
framework for reinstatement of voting rights and felon classification,
coupled with the discussion in part IV.A of the failure of these
disenfranchisement statutes in preventing recidivism or promoting
rehabilitation, clearly shows that felon disenfranchisement is an
impractical means of furthering any legitimate state interests. Also, it is
clear from the discussions in this part IV regarding public opinion of
these disenfranchisement statutes, which most persons disagree with
felon disenfranchisement109 so it can be inferred that society has
abandoned the social contract theory upon which felon
disenfranchisement is based. Finally, it is a fact that over the last 40
years, the rate of incarceration has grown at an extraordinary rate.110
“[H]istorical estimates of the imprisonment rate in state and federal
facilities . . . demonstrates that from 1925 until about the middle of the
1970s the rate did not rise above 140 persons imprisoned per 100,000 of
the population.”111 However, by 2011, the incarceration rate had raised to
106
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423 persons per 100,000 of the population.112 Given that the rate of
incarceration has risen so drastically, the implications of felon
disenfranchisement are far more devastating, as evidenced by its impact
on the 2000 general election, and consequently, the holding in
Richardson v. Ramirez is ripe for reconsideration due to its grave
implications that have only recently become evident.
While arguments for reconsideration of the dicta in Trop v. Dulles
were mentioned in Part IV.C.ii, we must also consider arguments in the
context of deciding whether the factors for reconsidering that precedent
have been met. In regards to the first factor, it appears that the
classification of disenfranchisement statutes as regulatory and not
punitive was not the central issue in Trop. The central issue was actually
whether a forfeiture of citizenship comports with the Constitution113 and
the resulting rule was that “denationalization as punishment is barred by
the Eighth Amendment”114 and it results in a “total destruction of the
individual’s status in organized society.”115 This ruling, as mentioned
before, is laced with inconsistencies, and consequently, can either be
reconsidered or merely “reinterpreted”116 to fit squarely with a new
decision invalidating felon disenfranchisement laws. If however we
consider Justice Warren’s dicta as controlling, because the franchise of
voting has evolved significantly since 1958, the denial of the franchise is
akin to punishment, so Justice Warren’s sentiments simply don’t reflect
the current reality of felon disenfranchisement. Additionally, the
statistics mentioned earlier also support the idea that felon
disenfranchisement is in fact a means of punishment as society is in
strong opposition of such laws. While Trop was already standing on very
shaky ground, it appears that the factors for reconsidering its holding
have been met and accordingly, the Supreme Court has a clear opening
to reconsider its decision in Trop.
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V.

DILUTION OF THE BLACK VOTE

105

WILL WE CONTINUE TO KEEP THE BLACK MAN FROM THE
BALLOT?

“Keep the black man from the ballot and we’ll treat him as we
please, with no means for protection, we will rule with perfect ease.”117
The right to vote is a fundamental function of citizens in the
democratic process. It gives each person a voice, a choice and a sense of
belonging. For African Americans, it also represents a badge of freedom
that many of their ancestors fought and died for. In 1965, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. described voting as the foundation stone for political
action. He noted, “With it the Negro can eventually vote out of office
public officials who bar the doorway to decent housing, public safety,
jobs, and decent integrated education. It is now obvious that the basic
elements so vital to Negro advancement can only be achieved by seeking
redress from government at local, state, and federal levels. To do this the
vote is essential.”118
The plight of Black America has lasted from the days of slavery to
2016, and the clock is still ticking. Before Blacks could taste the true
victory of freedom, they were again enslaved by institutional structures
carefully designed to keep them oppressed. From the point of being
granted the right to vote, there were literacy tests, polling taxes,
grandfather clauses and now with mass incarceration for essentially
“living while Black,”119 continued use of the device of felon
disenfranchisement ensures that the full potency of the Black vote will
never be a reality. Unless something is done to cure this societal defect,
we can be sure that America will never reach its ideal as a post racial
society. Because African Americans have historically been oppressed,
the right to vote is one of the most powerful tools with which they can
effect change that will bring them closer to true equality in America. It is
with that right that they can “begin breaking down injustice and
destroying the terrible walls which imprison men because they are
different from other men.”120
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By no means do I believe that crimes should go unpunished. I fully
support the notion that those who engage in criminal conduct must be
held accountable under the rule of law. However, it is the criminal justice
system that is best situated to undertake the task of ensuring that
individuals, armed with their constitutional rights, can state their case, be
evaluated and, if necessary, punished according to the severity of their
crime. Disenfranchisement after an individual has been released into
society serves only as blanket over-punishment that disproportionately
affects Black America by diluting its political power. If we are to believe
that post-incarceration rehabilitation is truly a goal of America’s justice
system, stripping ex-felons of their right to vote seems to directly
undermine that goal. By demoting ex-felons to second-class citizens, we
are reminding them that they are not truly ever welcome back into the
community. We remind them that they are not equal. Any threat to
achieving true equality is really a threat to the entire democracy, and
consequently, federal intervention is absolutely necessary to ensure that
America continues towards its quest to “form a more perfect union.”121
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